

AMENDMENT TO
RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 117-31
OFFERED BY MR. CHABOT OF OHIO

Title VI of division D is amended to read as follows:

1 **TITLE VI—PRIORITIZING THE**
2 **THREAT POSED BY THE PRC**
3 **Subtitle A—Ideological**
4 **Competition**

5 **SEC. 30601. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING SOCIALISM.**

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

7 (1) According to Merriam-Webster, socialism
8 may be defined as “any of various economic and po-
9 litical theories advocating collective or governmental
10 ownership and administration of the means of pro-
11 duction and distribution of goods”.

12 (2) At the core of socialist thought are the be-
13 liefs that property ultimately belongs to the state not
14 the individual and that the individual is entitled to
15 an equal share of resources, regardless of work ethic,
16 skill, talent, or other merit or endowment.

17 (3) The People’s Republic of China is the
18 world’s foremost socialist state and one of the few
19 remaining Communist states.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
2 gress that—

3 (1) socialism is antithetical to the American
4 way of life which emphasizes hard work, personal
5 discipline, innovation, entrepreneurship, the family,
6 the right to pass on one's property to one's dece-
7 dents, and the right to enjoy the fruits of ones la-
8 bors; and

9 (2) a world dominated by a socialist power or
10 powers would be inimical to American interests and
11 values.

12 **SEC. 30602. GENERAL SECRETARY ACT.**

13 (a) UNITED STATES POLICY.— It is the policy of the
14 United States to—

15 (1) condemn in the strongest possible terms the
16 horrific human rights abuses being perpetuated and
17 enabled by the leadership of the Chinese Communist
18 Party (CCP);

19 (2) urge all countries to do the same;

20 (3) recognize the deep friendship between the
21 United States and the citizens of the People's Re-
22 public of China, the first victims of their govern-
23 ment's cruelty; and

24 (4) honor the memory of all those who have
25 died as a result of the callous rule of the CCP.

(b) PROHIBITION ON USING FEDERAL FUNDS TO REFER TO THE HEAD OF STATE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS “PRESIDENT” ON NEW UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS.— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal Government may not obligate or expend any funds for the creation and dissemination of United States Government documents and communications that refer to the head of state of the People’s Republic of China as anything other than “General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party”, or alternatively, as “General Secretary”.

Subtitle B—Countering Gray Zone Threats

SEC. 30611. GRAY ZONE DEFENSE ASSESSMENT ACT.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress as follows:

(1) Gray zone competition is a central and enduring aspect of great-power competition and the United States should elevate, as a central feature of its approach to great-power competition, effective responses to, and capabilities to conduct, gray zone campaigns.

(2) An effective, whole-of-government approach, and especially the coordination of efforts among the Department of State, the Department of Defense,

1 the Intelligence Community, the Department of the
2 Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the
3 United States Agency for International Develop-
4 ment, is essential to meeting the gray zone chal-
5 lenges posed by competitors.

6 (3) Since gray zone activity takes place below
7 the threshold of major war and since narrative for-
8 mation is a critical aspect of gray zone campaigns,
9 the Department of State should take a preeminent
10 role in coordinating, within the National Security
11 Council process, the disparate means of national
12 power as the United States seeks to respond to ag-
13 gressive gray zone campaigns.

14 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
15 United States—

16 (1) to seek effective responses, particularly at
17 the Department of State, to gray zone campaigns by
18 United States adversaries and to recognize the para-
19 mount importance of such responses to the national
20 interests of the United States;

21 (2) that upholding the international rule of law
22 and the rules-based international order, championed
23 by the United States since the Second World War,
24 is a core national security interest of the United
25 States and that United States gray zone campaigns

1 shall seek to uphold this core national security inter-
2 est; and

3 (3) to call on United States allies and partners
4 to employ sufficient national resources to equitably
5 contribute to the response to shared security and
6 gray zone challenges.

7 (c) EVALUATION OF NATIONAL CAPACITIES FOR
8 CONDUCTING GRAY ZONE OPERATIONS.—

9 (1) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after
10 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
11 shall conduct a review and submit to the appropriate
12 congressional committees a report on the capabilities
13 of the United States to conduct and respond to gray
14 zone campaigns and proposed changes to enhance
15 such capabilities.

16 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para-
17 graph (1) shall also include the following:

18 (A) A discussion of capacity and effective-
19 ness of the interagency to routinely marshal
20 disparate elements of national power to effec-
21 tively respond in a coordinated manner to ad-
22 versary gray zone campaigns against the United
23 States or partner nations.

24 (B) A discussion of the interagency's ca-
25 pacity to recognize adversary campaigns from

1 weak signals, including rivals' intent, capability,
2 impact, interactive effects, and impact on
3 United States interests.

4 (C) A description of the process for deter-
5 mining the tolerance for adversary gray zone
6 activity, including the methods and mechanisms
7 for—

8 (i) determining which adversary gray
9 zone activities are unacceptable;

10 (ii) communicating these positions to
11 adversaries;

12 (iii) developing theories of deterrence;

13 and

14 (iv) establishing and regularly review-
15 ing protocols with allies and partners to re-
16 spond to such activities.

17 (D) Recommendations for addressing gaps
18 between agencies of the Federal Government as
19 well as inadequacies and inefficiencies in the
20 interagency coordination of such agencies and
21 their elements, including—

22 (i) a discussion of how such rec-
23 ommendations will be sufficient to achieve
24 United States gray zone objectives and to

1 counter adversary gray zone campaigns;
2 and

3 (ii) rough order-of-magnitude budget
4 estimates for the implementations of the
5 recommendations.

6 (E) A description of the institutional re-
7 forms undertaken or planned to be undertaken
8 to address the gaps identified pursuant to sub-
9 paragraph (D) to better enable effective gray
10 zone campaigns.

11 (F) A description of any proposed institu-
12 tional reform, including for which the President
13 requires additional statutory authority and a
14 justification for such additional authority.

15 (G) Any proposed necessary investments or
16 legislative proposals for the creation or aug-
17 mentation of institutions or authorities to sig-
18 nificantly increase United States capability to
19 mitigate gray zone threats, the rationale for
20 each, and expected cost.

21 (H) A description of the process for deter-
22 mining political warfare tolerance, including
23 for—

24 (i) determining which adversary gray
25 zone activities are unacceptable;

1 (ii) communicating these positions to
2 adversaries; and

3 (iii) establishing and regularly review-
4 ing protocols with allies and partners to re-
5 spond to such activities.

6 (3) FORM.—The report required by this sub-
7 section shall be submitted in unclassified format and
8 may contain a classified annex.

9 (4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
10 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term “ap-
11 propriate congressional committees” means—

12 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
13 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
14 the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
15 mittee on Financial Services, the Committee on
16 Energy and Commerce, and the Committee on
17 Homeland Security of the House of Representa-
18 tives; and

19 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
20 the Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com-
21 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on
22 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the
23 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
24 portation, and the Committee on Homeland Se-
25 curity and Governmental Affairs of the Senate.

1 (d) DEPARTMENT OF STATE GRAY ZONE DEFENSE
2 ASSESSMENT.—

3 (1) REPORT ON GRAY ZONE CAPABILITIES OF
4 THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—

5 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180
6 days after the date of the enactment of this
7 Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
8 appropriate congressional committees a report
9 discussing the capabilities of the Department of
10 State to contribute to the ability of the United
11 States to defend against and conduct gray zone
12 campaigns.

13 (B) ELEMENTS.—The report required by
14 subparagraph (A) shall also include the fol-
15 lowing:

16 (i) The capabilities, offices, and units
17 that are especially suited to gray zone op-
18 erations and a description of the cor-
19 responding roles to play.

20 (ii) A list of activities that are being
21 undertaken, as of the date of the submis-
22 sion of the report, to respond to adversary
23 gray zone campaigns.

24 (iii) An evaluation of the adequacy
25 and utility of established Department of

1 State definitions for understanding gray
2 zone activity by adversaries and for
3 operationalizing gray zone efforts.

4 (iv) Recommendations, including pro-
5 posed necessary investments and the ra-
6 tionale and expected costs of such invest-
7 ments, for addressing gaps within the De-
8 partment of State and its coordination
9 with the interagency to effectively conduct
10 gray zone operations.

11 (v) An identification of 25 priority
12 countries at the front lines of adversary
13 gray zone aggression and a discussion of
14 the information described in clauses (i)
15 through (iii) with respect to each such
16 country, developed in consultation with rel-
17 evant embassy country teams.

18 (2) CONTESTING THE INFORMATION
19 BATTLESPACE.—

20 (A) FINDING.—Congress finds that the
21 Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and
22 Public Affairs of the Department of State could
23 be presumed to be responsible for coordinating
24 all public relations components of gray zone
25 campaigns, while in fact such responsibilities

1 are not so located nor are they effectively co-
2 ordinated.

3 (B) FOREIGN DISINFORMATION EFFORTS
4 REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
6 of State, acting through the Under Secretary
7 for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, shall
8 submit to the appropriate congressional com-
9 mittees a report summarizing United States
10 policy on foreign disinformation and propa-
11 ganda efforts in the global information contest,
12 that shall include—

13 (i) a list of all elements of current
14 United States policy relating to this issue;

15 (ii) a brief summary of the threats
16 faced to United States interests and the
17 nature of the United States response, in-
18 cluding—

19 (I) the broad objectives of United
20 States global information operations
21 and needed additional capabilities;

22 (II) which offices or entities with-
23 in the Department, and within the
24 broader United States Government,

1 are responsible for conducting infor-
2 mation operations;

3 (III) a list of current activities
4 and programs, within the Department
5 and across the United States Govern-
6 ment, that currently comprise United
7 States efforts; and

8 (IV) a list of specific additional
9 capabilities and investments required
10 to improve United States effectiveness
11 and order of magnitude cost esti-
12 mates;

13 (iii) a description of the processes
14 within the Department of State for vetting
15 and accountability for Global Engagement
16 Center grantees, to prevent misuse or
17 mistargeting of information campaigns;

18 (iv) examples of the effective use of
19 targeted international development and
20 stabilization assistance as part of gray
21 zone campaigns;

22 (v) an assessment of the manner and
23 extent to which gray zone considerations
24 have been included when planning invest-

1 ments in security cooperation and security-
2 sector assistance; and

3 (vi) the adequacy of the Department
4 of State's public affairs elements, including
5 the Global Engagement Center, for con-
6 ducting and responding to information op-
7 erations conducted as part of a gray zone
8 campaign.

9 (C) REPORT ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WITH
10 RESPECT TO MALIGN ACTIVITIES OF THE
11 PRC.—Not later than 90 days after the date of
12 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
13 State, in consultation with the Administrator of
14 the United States Agency for International De-
15 velopment and the Chief Executive Officer of
16 the United States Agency for Global Media,
17 shall submit to the appropriate congressional
18 committees a report that describes the efforts of
19 the Department of State with respect to re-
20 search to determine which strategic communica-
21 tions techniques and methods are most useful
22 at reaching populations that are targets of Chi-
23 nese disinformation.

24 (3) GRAY ZONE THREATS AT MULTILATERAL
25 ORGANIZATIONS.—

1 (A) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—The Prin-
2 cipal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau
3 of International Organization Affairs shall
4 prioritize efforts to counter attempts by the
5 People’s Republic of China (PRC) to control
6 and coerce international organizations.

7 (B) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than
8 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
9 Act, the Secretary of State, acting through the
10 Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
11 Bureau of International Organization Affairs,
12 shall submit to the appropriate congressional
13 committees a report on threats to United States
14 interests at international organizations.

15 (C) ELEMENTS.—The report required by
16 subparagraph (B) shall also include each of the
17 following:

18 (i) An assessment of the level of influ-
19 ence exerted by the PRC, and the vectors
20 for such influence, at—

21 (I) each specialized organization
22 or agency of the United Nations;

23 (II) the World Bank, the Inter-
24 national Monetary Fund, and the
25 World Trade Organization; and

1 (III) any other international or-
2 ganization the Principal Deputy As-
3 sistant Secretary determines is sub-
4 stantially and illicitly influenced by
5 the PRC.

6 (ii) The total annual Chinese financial
7 contributions, total annual United States
8 contributions, and total annual contribu-
9 tions of the top six donors to each organi-
10 zation assessed pursuant to clause (i).

11 (iii) An assessment of the multilateral
12 organizations where enhanced United
13 States efforts, support, or engagement
14 would materially contribute to competitive
15 advantage in the gray zone, including spe-
16 cific proposed activities and associated
17 costs.

18 (4) FORM.—Each report required by this sub-
19 section shall be submitted in unclassified form but
20 may contain a classified annex.

21 (5) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
22 TEES DEFINED.—In this sbusection, the term “ap-
23 propriate congressional committees” means the
24 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep-

1 representatives and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
2 tions of the Senate.

3 (6) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—

4 The Secretary of State is authorized to consolidate
5 the reports required by this subsection.

6 (e) INDO-PACIFIC PRIORITY THEATER FOR GRAY
7 ZONE RESPONSE.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Among the gray zone cam-
9 paigns the Department of State seeks to counter,
10 the Secretary of State shall give particular priority
11 to responding to campaigns conducted by the PRC
12 (including its agents or instrumentalities), including
13 by—

14 (A) requiring each diplomatic or consular
15 post in the East-Asia Pacific and South and
16 Central Asia regions to prominently include in
17 their country strategies responses to Chinese
18 gray zone activities and the building of gray
19 zone deterrence capabilities; and

20 (B) ensuring sufficient staffing at diplo-
21 matic and consular posts throughout the Indo-
22 Pacific to effectively counter Chinese gray zone
23 campaigns.

24 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the
25 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of

1 State shall submit to the Committees on Armed
2 Services of the Senate and the House of Representa-
3 tives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
4 Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
5 House of Representatives a report that includes a
6 short summary of Indo-Pacific maritime gray zone
7 threats and also includes—

8 (A) an outline of the United States posi-
9 tion on primary maritime gray zone operations
10 and associated territorial disputes in the Indo-
11 Pacific;

12 (B) specific gray zone actions undertaken
13 by the PRC to gain gradual advantage with re-
14 spect to its territorial claims;

15 (C) places where the norms of inter-
16 national and maritime law are most at risk of
17 being ignored or subverted;

18 (D) any proposed opportunities for the res-
19 olution of territorial disputes and potential
20 United States contributions to such efforts; and

21 (E) the specific actions with respect to
22 such maritime gray zone threats which, if un-
23 dertaken by the PRC, would be considered un-
24 acceptable according to stated United States
25 policy.

1 (3) FORM.—The report required to be sub-
2 mitted by this subsection shall be submitted in clas-
3 sified form with an unclassified summary.

4 (f) STRATEGY ON RESOURCE NEEDS TO ADDRESS
5 PRC GRAY ZONE CAMPAIGNS.—

6 (1) CONSOLIDATED JUSTIFICATION RE-
7 QUIRED.—The President shall include in the budget
8 materials submitted in support of the budget of the
9 President (submitted to Congress pursuant to sec-
10 tion 1105 of title 31, United States Code) for fiscal
11 year 2023, and shall update in the budget materials
12 submitted in support of the budget of the President
13 for each fiscal year thereafter, a consolidated, inter-
14 agency justification for how the budget will provide
15 sufficient resources to respond to the PRC's gray
16 zone campaigns. Such discussion shall incorporate
17 the following elements:

18 (A) An explanation of the manner in which
19 the funding levels proposed in such budget will
20 be sufficient to achieve United States gray zone
21 and diplomatic objectives, including supporting
22 documentation.

23 (B) An explanation of the manner in which
24 the funding levels proposed in such budget will
25 be sufficient to implement each of the actions

1 proposed to be taken pursuant to the require-
2 ments of this section.

3 (2) REPORT ON STAFFING IN THE INDO-PA-
4 CIFIC.—In conjunction with the first consolidated
5 justification required by paragraph (1), the Sec-
6 retary of State, in consultation with the Adminis-
7 trator of the United States Agency for International
8 Development, the Director of National Intelligence,
9 the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Com-
10 merce, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Af-
11 fairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce
12 of the House of Representatives and the Committee
13 on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Com-
14 merce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a
15 report that discusses the relative numbers of United
16 States and Chinese diplomatic, commercial, and mili-
17 tary personnel in the Indo-Pacific region. The report
18 shall also include—

19 (A) the disaggregated numbers of United
20 States and Chinese diplomatic, commerce pro-
21 motion, and military personnel stationed in
22 each country in the region;

23 (B) an assessment of the relative capabili-
24 ties of Chinese diplomatic missions in each such
25 country to influence private- and public-sector

1 decision making, compared to those of the
2 United States;

3 (C) an assessment of the strength of busi-
4 ness ties between the PRC and each such coun-
5 try; and

6 (D) a determination whether businesses or
7 other entities owned or controlled by the PRC
8 or by Chinese persons are serving as auxiliaries
9 for Chinese diplomatic missions to such coun-
10 try.

11 (3) FORM.—The explanation and documenta-
12 tion described in paragraph (1)(A) and the report
13 described in paragraph (2) shall be submitted in
14 classified form with an unclassified summary.

15 **SEC. 30612. PROHIBITION ON FEDERAL FUNDING TO THE**
16 **WUHAN INSTITUTE OF VIROLOGY.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—No funds authorized or appro-
18 priated by Federal law may be made available for any pur-
19 pose to the Wuhan Institute of Virology.

20 (b) GAO STUDY AND REPORT.—Not later than 2
21 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
22 Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct
23 a study, and submit to Congress a report, on the amount
24 of Federal funds awarded or indirectly given to Wuhan
25 Institute of Virology or researchers affiliated with Wuhan

1 Institute of Virology, during the 15-year period preceding
2 such date of enactment were provided, whether purposely
3 or inadvertently, to the People's Republic of China, Chi-
4 nese Communist Party, or the Wuhan Institute of Virol-
5 ogy, or any agency or instrumentality thereof.

6 **SEC. 30613. REPORT ON FUNDING OF PRC ENTITIES.**

7 (a) GENERAL REPORT ON FEDERAL FUNDING.—The
8 Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall
9 include in the budget materials submitted in support of
10 the budget of the President (submitted to Congress pursu-
11 ant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code) for
12 each fiscal year beginning after the date of the enactment
13 of this Act a report that specifies with respect to each
14 account in the Treasury for which Federal funds are re-
15 quested in such budget the information described in sub-
16 section (c).

17 (b) ADDITIONAL REPORT ON FEDERAL FUNDING.—
18 The head of each Federal department or agency shall in-
19 clude in the budget materials submitted in support of the
20 budget of the President (submitted to Congress pursuant
21 to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code) for each
22 fiscal year beginning after the date of the enactment of
23 this Act a report that specifies the information described
24 in subsection (c) with respect to each account—

1 (1) from which funds are made available to
2 carry out the programs, projects, or activities of
3 such department or agency; and

4 (2) that is not included in the corresponding re-
5 port required under subsection (a).

6 (c) REPORT REQUIREMENTS.—The information de-
7 scribed in this subsection is the following with respect to
8 an account:

9 (1) Each amount made available from such ac-
10 count during the preceding fiscal year to any Chi-
11 nese person or entity, disaggregated by each such
12 person or entity.

13 (2) Each amount made available from such ac-
14 count during the preceding fiscal year to any Fed-
15 eral program, project, or activity conducted in part-
16 nership with a Chinese person or entity, disaggre-
17 gated by each such partner.

18 (3) Each amount made available from such ac-
19 count during the preceding fiscal year to any Chi-
20 nese person or entity that is owned or controlled by
21 a United States entity, disaggregated by each such
22 United States entity.

23 (4) Each amount made available from such ac-
24 count during the preceding fiscal year to any Fed-
25 eral employee for the purpose of carrying out any

1 program, project, or activity in China, disaggregated
2 by each such program, project, or activity.

3 (5) Each amount made available from such ac-
4 count during the preceding fiscal year to any joint,
5 collaborative, or bilateral effort between the United
6 States and China, disaggregated by each such effort.

7 (d) INITIAL REPORT.—The first report submitted
8 after the date of the enactment of this Act under sub-
9 section (a) or subsection (b) shall include the information
10 described in subsection (c) with respect to the 10 pre-
11 ceding fiscal years.

12 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

13 (1) CHINESE PERSON OR ENTITY.—The term
14 “Chinese person or entity” means—

15 (A) the Government of China;

16 (B) the Chinese Communist Party;

17 (C) any satellite or other foreign campus
18 of a United States institution of higher edu-
19 cation (as such term is defined in section 101
20 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
21 U.S.C. 1001)) that is located in China;

22 (D) an individual who is a citizen or na-
23 tional of China and permanently resides in
24 China; and

1 (E) any other entity organized under the
2 laws of China, or any jurisdiction within China,
3 including—

4 (i) any United States branch of such
5 entity; and

6 (ii) any branch of a United States en-
7 tity that is located in China.

8 (2) UNITED STATES ENTITY.—The term
9 “United States entity” means—

10 (A) an institution of higher education (as
11 such term is defined in section 101 of the High-
12 er Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001));
13 and

14 (B) any other entity organized under the
15 laws of the United States or any jurisdiction
16 within the United States.

17 **Subtitle C—Human Rights**

18 **SEC. 30621. FALUN GONG PROTECTION ACT.**

19 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
20 gress that—

21 (1) killing a human being through involuntary
22 organ extraction is an egregious violation of uni-
23 versal standards of medical ethics and is in direct
24 contradiction of basic standards of human decency;

1 (2) the forced harvesting of organs violates Ar-
2 ticle 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human
3 Rights, which states that “Everyone has the right to
4 life, liberty and security of person.”, and Article 4,
5 which states that “No one shall be held in slavery
6 or servitude.”;

7 (3) the United Nations Human Rights Council
8 should issue a formal condemnation of the People’s
9 Republic of China (PRC) for its persecution of
10 Falun Gong;

11 (4) any collaboration with or participation in
12 the PRC’s organ transplant system by the United
13 States Government or a United States person or or-
14 ganization presents serious ethical challenges that
15 would jeopardize the integrity of the United States
16 organ transplantation system; and

17 (5) the Chinese Communist Party’s state-spon-
18 sored persecution of Falun Gong must come to an
19 immediate end.

20 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
21 United States to—

22 (1) avoid any cooperation with the PRC in the
23 organ transplantation field while the Chinese Com-
24 munist Party remains in power;

1 (2) take appropriate measures, including using
2 relevant sanctions authorities, to coerce the Chinese
3 Communist Party to end any state-sponsored organ
4 harvesting campaign; and

5 (3) work with allies, partners, and multilateral
6 institutions to highlight China's persecution of
7 Falun Gong and coordinate closely with the inter-
8 national community on targeted sanctions and visa
9 restrictions.

10 (c) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
11 FORCED ORGAN HARVESTING WITHIN THE PEOPLE'S
12 REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—

13 (1) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President
14 shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph (3)
15 with respect to each foreign person included in the
16 most recent list submitted pursuant to paragraph
17 (2).

18 (2) LIST OF PERSONS.—

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180
20 days after the date of the enactment of this
21 Act, the President shall submit to the appro-
22 priate congressional committees a list of foreign
23 persons, including senior government officials,
24 military leaders, and other persons who the
25 President determines are knowingly responsible

1 for or complicit in, or have directly or indirectly
2 engaged in, the involuntary harvesting of or-
3 gans within the People's Republic of China.

4 (B) UPDATES OF LISTS.—The President
5 shall submit to the appropriate congressional
6 committees an updated list under subparagraph
7 (A)—

8 (i) as new information becomes avail-
9 able;

10 (ii) not later than one year after the
11 date of the enactment of this Act; and

12 (iii) annually thereafter for five years.

13 (C) FORM.—The list required by subpara-
14 graph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified
15 form, but may include a classified annex.

16 (3) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-
17 scribed in this paragraph are the following:

18 (A) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The Presi-
19 dent shall exercise all of the powers granted to
20 the President by the International Emergency
21 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)
22 (except that the requirements of section 202 of
23 such Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall not apply) to
24 the extent necessary to block and prohibit all
25 transactions in property and interests in prop-

1 erty of the person if such property and interests
2 in property are in the United States, come
3 within the United States, or are or come within
4 the possession or control of a United States
5 person.

6 (B) INADMISSIBILITY OF CERTAIN INDI-
7 VIDUALS.—

8 (i) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMIS-
9 SION, OR PAROLE.—A foreign person in-
10 cluded in the most recent list submitted
11 pursuant to paragraph (2) is—

12 (I) inadmissible to the United
13 States;

14 (II) ineligible to receive a visa or
15 other documentation to enter the
16 United States; and

17 (III) otherwise ineligible to be
18 admitted or paroled into the United
19 States or to receive any other benefit
20 under the Immigration and Nation-
21 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

22 (ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—A
23 foreign person described in clause (i) is
24 also subject to the following:

1 (I) Revocation of any visa or
2 other entry documentation regardless
3 of when the visa or other entry docu-
4 mentation is or was issued.

5 (II) A revocation under subclause
6 (I) shall take effect immediately and
7 automatically cancel any other valid
8 visa or entry documentation that is in
9 the foreign person's possession.

10 (C) EXCEPTION.—Sanctions under sub-
11 paragraph (B) shall not apply to an alien if ad-
12 mitting or paroling the alien into the United
13 States is necessary to permit the United States
14 to comply with the Agreement regarding the
15 Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at
16 Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into
17 force November 21, 1947, between the United
18 Nations and the United States, or other appli-
19 cable international obligations of the United
20 States.

21 (4) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided for in
22 subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the Inter-
23 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
24 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a person who violates,
25 attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a

1 violation of regulations promulgated to carry out
2 paragraph (1) to the same extent that such penalties
3 apply to a person who commits an unlawful act de-
4 scribed in section 206(a) of that Act.

5 (5) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH NATIONAL
6 SECURITY.—The following activities shall be exempt
7 from sanctions under this subsection:

8 (A) Activities subject to the reporting re-
9 quirements under title V of the National Secu-
10 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.).

11 (B) Any authorized intelligence or law en-
12 forcement activities of the United States.

13 (d) REPORT.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year
15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
16 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of
17 Health and Human Services and the Director of the
18 National Institutes of Health, shall submit to the
19 appropriate congressional committees a report on
20 the organ transplant policies and practices of the
21 People's Republic of China.

22 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
23 required under paragraph (1) shall include—

24 (A) a summary of de jure and de facto
25 policies toward organ transplantation in the

1 PRC, including with respect to prisoners of con-
2 science (including Falun Gong) and other pris-
3 oners;

4 (B)(i) the number of organ transplants
5 that are known to occur or are estimated to
6 occur on an annual basis in the PRC;

7 (ii) the number of known or estimated vol-
8 untary organ donors in the PRC;

9 (iii) an assessment of the sources of organs
10 for transplant in the PRC; and

11 (iv) an assessment of the time, in days,
12 that it takes to procure an organ for transplant
13 within the Chinese medical system and an as-
14 sessment of whether such timetable is possible
15 based on the number of known or estimated
16 organ donors in the PRC;

17 (C) a list of all United States grants over
18 the past 10 years that have supported research
19 on organ transplantation in the PRC or in col-
20 laboration between a Chinese and a United
21 States entity; and

22 (D) a determination as to whether the per-
23 secution of Falun Gong practitioners within the
24 People's Republic of China constitutes an
25 "atrocitiy" (as such term is defined in section 6

1 of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Pre-
2 vention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22
3 U.S.C. 2656 note)).

4 (3) FORM.—The report required under para-
5 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
6 but may include a classified annex.

7 (e) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-
8 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-
9 sional committees” means—

10 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
11 House of Representatives; and

12 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
13 Senate.

14 **SEC. 30622. AUTHORIZATION OF SANCTIONS FOR CHINESE**
15 **REPATRIATION OF NORTH KOREAN REFU-**
16 **GEES.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph (1) of section 104(b)
18 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement
19 Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9214; Public Law 114–122) is
20 amended—

21 (1) in subparagraph (M), by striking “or” after
22 the semicolon;

23 (2) in subparagraph (N), by striking the period
24 and inserting “; or”; and

1 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub-
2 paragraph:

3 “(O) knowingly, directly or indirectly, re-
4 patriating North Korean refugees to North
5 Korea.”.

6 (b) TECHNICAL CORRECTION.—Subparagraph (A) of
7 section 104(b)(2) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy
8 Enhancement Act of 2016 is amended by striking
9 “205(c)” and inserting “205(d)”.

10 **Subtitle D—Defending Our**
11 **Economy From the PRC**

12 **SEC. 30631. DEFUND PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY ACT.**

13 (a) PROHIBITIONS ON CCP COMPANIES LISTED IN
14 BOTH THE SECTION 1237 LIST AND THE SECTION 1260H
15 LIST.—

16 (1) PROHIBITION ON PURCHASE OR SALE OF
17 CERTAIN SECURITIES.—Except as provided in para-
18 graph (5) or paragraph (8)(B), a United States per-
19 son is prohibited from purchasing or selling any—

20 (A) publicly traded security issued by a
21 covered entity;

22 (B) publicly traded security that is deriva-
23 tive of a publicly traded security issued by a
24 covered entity; and

1 (C) security that is designed to provide in-
2 vestment exposure to a publicly traded security
3 issued by a covered entity.

4 (2) COVERED ENTITIES.—The term “covered
5 entity” includes the following:

6 (A) Any person that is a Communist Chi-
7 nese military company and included on the list
8 maintained by the Department of Defense in
9 accordance with section 1237(b) of the Strom
10 Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act
11 for Fiscal Year 1999 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) as
12 of the date of the enactment of this Act.

13 (B) Any person that was designated as a
14 Communist Chinese military company on June
15 2, 2021, in accordance with such section
16 1237(b).

17 (C) Any person that is a Chinese military
18 company or a military-civil fusion contributor
19 and included on the list maintained by the De-
20 partment of Defense in accordance with section
21 1260H(b) of the National Defense Authoriza-
22 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (10 U.S.C. 113
23 note) as of the date of the enactment of this
24 Act.

25 (3) APPLICABILITY.—

1 (A) INITIAL APPLICABILITY.—If a person
2 qualifies as covered entity on the date of the en-
3 actment of this Act, the prohibitions under this
4 section shall apply to any purchase or sale that
5 occurs at or after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight
6 time on the date that is 60 days after the date
7 of the enactment of this Act.

8 (B) FUTURE ADDITIONS.—If a person
9 qualifies as covered entity after the date of the
10 enactment of this Act, the prohibitions under
11 this section shall apply to any purchase or sale
12 that occurs at or after 12:01 a.m. eastern day-
13 light time on the date that is 60 days after the
14 date on which the person qualifies as a covered
15 entity.

16 (4) RULE OF APPLICATION.—The prohibitions
17 under this subsection shall apply except to the ex-
18 tent provided by statutes, or in any regulation,
19 order, directive, or license that may be issued pursu-
20 ant to this section, and notwithstanding any con-
21 tract entered into or any license granted before the
22 date of enactment of this Act.

23 (5) EXCEPTION WITH RESPECT TO DIVEST-
24 MENT.—Notwithstanding paragraph (1), the pur-
25 chase or sale of publicly traded securities otherwise

1 prohibited by such paragraph that is made solely to
2 affect the divestment, in whole or in part, of such
3 securities by a United States person shall be per-
4 mitted until—

5 (A) 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on
6 June 3, 2022, with respect to any person that
7 qualifies as a covered entity on the date of the
8 enactment of this Act; or

9 (B) 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on
10 the date that is 1 year after the date on which
11 a person qualifies as a covered entity after the
12 date of the enactment of this Act.

13 (6) MAINTENANCE OF LISTS.—The Secretary of
14 Defense is authorized to make additions or deletions
15 to the lists described in paragraph (2) on an ongoing
16 basis based on the latest information available. The
17 Secretary of Defense shall, concurrently with the
18 publication of the lists in accordance with the appli-
19 cable provisions of law, transmit a copy of such lists
20 to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
21 Treasury, and the Director of National Intelligence.

22 (7) EVASION OF PROHIBITION.—The following
23 acts are prohibited:

24 (A) Any transactions by a United States
25 person or within the United States that evade

1 or avoid, or have the purpose of evading or
2 avoiding, cause a violation of, or attempt to vio-
3 late the prohibitions set forth in this section.

4 (B) Any conspiracy formed to violate any
5 of the prohibition set forth in this section.

6 (8) AUTHORIZATION FOR REGULATIONS AND
7 PENALTIES.—

8 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the
9 Treasury, after consultation with the Secretary
10 of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director
11 of National Intelligence, and the heads of other
12 executive departments and agencies as deemed
13 appropriate by the Secretary of the Treasury, is
14 hereby authorized to take such actions, includ-
15 ing the promulgation of rules and regulations,
16 and to employ all powers granted to the Presi-
17 dent by the International Emergency Economic
18 Powers Act, to carry out the purposes of this
19 section.

20 (B) REGULATIONS.—Rules and regulations
21 issued pursuant to this section may, among
22 other things, establish procedures to license
23 transactions otherwise prohibited pursuant to
24 this section if, prior to issuing any license
25 under this section, the Secretary of the Treas-

1 ury shall consult with the Secretary of State,
2 the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of
3 National Intelligence.

4 (C) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided
5 for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of
6 the International Emergency Economic Powers
7 Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) with respect to a person
8 that knowingly violates, attempts to violate,
9 conspires to violate, or causes a violation of reg-
10 ulations promulgated under this paragraph or
11 commits any acts described in paragraph (6) to
12 the same extent that such penalties apply to a
13 person that knowingly commits an unlawful act
14 described in section 206(a) of that Act.

15 (b) LIMITATION ON JUDICIAL REVIEW.—

16 (1) DECISIONS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—
17 The decision of the Secretary of Defense as to any
18 question regarding the inclusion of a Communist
19 Chinese military company, a Chinese military com-
20 pany, or a military-civil fusion contributor on either
21 of the lists described in subsection (a)(2) may not be
22 reviewed by any official or by any court, whether by
23 action in the nature of mandamus or otherwise.

24 (2) RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED
25 BY THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.—The rules

1 and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the
2 Treasury under subsection (a)(8) shall be final and
3 not subject to any further agency review or to judi-
4 cial review by any court (including under chapter 7
5 of title 5, United States Code).

6 **SEC. 30632. CODIFYING THE DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVI-**
7 **LEGES AND RELATED PROVISIONS UNDER**
8 **TITLE 15, CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.**

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that—

11 (1) denial orders are an important foreign pol-
12 icy tool to use against foreign entities and individ-
13 uals, especially Chinese persons, with a pattern of
14 violating United States laws, especially laws relating
15 to intellectual property; and

16 (2) the Department of Commerce should vigor-
17 ously utilize denial orders to hold such persons ac-
18 countable.

19 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than one year after the
20 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Com-
21 merce, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the
22 Secretary of Treasury, and Attorney General, shall submit
23 to Congress a strategy regarding how denial orders issued
24 by the Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department
25 of Commerce to deny the export privileges of foreign enti-

1 ties and individuals, especially entities and individuals lo-
2 cated in China, can be better utilized as part of a holistic
3 approach to hold such entities and individuals accountable
4 for theft of United States intellectual property.

5 (c) CODIFICATION OF DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVI-
6 LEGES AND RELATED PROVISIONS UNDER TITLE 15,
7 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS.—The provisions of
8 part 730 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, relating
9 to general information, and section 766.25 of such title,
10 relating to administrative action denying export privileges,
11 are hereby enacted into law.

12 **SEC. 30633. CHINA TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CONTROL ACT**
13 **OF 2021.**

14 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

15 (1) CHINESE PERSON.—The term “Chinese
16 person” means—

17 (A) an individual who is a citizen or na-
18 tional of the People’s Republic of China; or

19 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
20 the People’s Republic of China or otherwise
21 subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of
22 the People’s Republic of China.

23 (2) COVERED NATIONAL INTEREST TECH-
24 NOLOGY OR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—The term

1 “covered national interest technology or intellectual
2 property” includes the following:

3 (A) Technology or intellectual property
4 that would make a significant contribution to
5 the military potential of the People’s Republic
6 of China that would prove detrimental to the
7 national security of the United States.

8 (B) Technology or intellectual property
9 that is a component of the production of prod-
10 ucts included in the most recent list required
11 under section 183 of the Trade Act of 1974, as
12 added by subsection (e)(1), determined in con-
13 sultation with the United States Trade Rep-
14 resentative.

15 (C) Technology used by the Government of
16 the People’s Republic of China to carry out vio-
17 lations of human rights or religious liberties.

18 (3) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-
19 son” means any person that is not a United States
20 person.

21 (4) KNOWINGLY.—The term “knowingly”, with
22 respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result,
23 means that a person has actual knowledge, or should
24 have known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the
25 result.

1 (5) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—The term “in-
2 tellectual property” means—

3 (A) any work protected by a copyright
4 under title 17, United States Code;

5 (B) any property protected by a patent
6 granted by the United States Patent and
7 Trademark Office under title 35, United States
8 Code;

9 (C) any word, name, symbol, or device, or
10 any combination thereof, that is registered as a
11 trademark with the United States Patent and
12 Trademark Office under the Act entitled “An
13 Act to provide for the registration and protec-
14 tion of trademarks used in commerce, to carry
15 out the provisions of certain international con-
16 ventions, and for other purposes”, approved
17 July 5, 1946 (commonly known as the
18 “Lanham Act” or the “Trademark Act of
19 1946”) (15 U.S.C. 1051 et seq.);

20 (D) a trade secret (as defined in section
21 1839 of title 18, United States Code); or

22 (E) any other form of intellectual property.

23 (6) TECHNOLOGY.—The term “technology” in-
24 cludes goods or services relating to information sys-
25 tems, internet-based services, production-enhancing

1 logistics, robotics, artificial intelligence, bio-
2 technology, or computing.

3 (7) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
4 “United States person” means—

5 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
6 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
7 United States; or

8 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
9 the United States or of any jurisdiction within
10 the United States, including a foreign branch of
11 such an entity.

12 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13 gress that—

14 (1) while the United States is committed to
15 promoting cultural and technological exchange with
16 other countries, it is our responsibility to protect the
17 United States when channels for such exchange are
18 exploited by adversaries; and

19 (2) the People’s Republic of China consistently
20 seeks to exploit those channels, not only in its theft
21 of intellectual property but also in its manipulation
22 of lawful transfer and uses of technology in ways
23 that directly support its military objectives and
24 threaten the United States.

1 (c) CONTROL OF EXPORT OF COVERED NATIONAL
2 INTEREST TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
3 TO PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—On and after the date that
5 is 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
6 Act, the President shall control the export or re-ex-
7 port to, or transfer in, the People's Republic of
8 China of any covered national interest technology or
9 intellectual property subject to the jurisdiction of the
10 United States or exported by any United States per-
11 son.

12 (2) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 90
13 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
14 Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce
15 shall jointly submit to Congress a report assessing
16 whether covered national interest technology or intel-
17 lectual property should be controlled as required by
18 paragraph (1) under—

19 (A) the International Traffic in Arms Reg-
20 ulations under subchapter M of chapter I of
21 title 22, Code of Federal Regulations; or

22 (B) the Export Administration Regulations
23 under subchapter C of chapter VII of title 15,
24 Code of Federal Regulations.

1 (3) REGULATIONS.—Not later than 180 days
2 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
3 President shall prescribe such regulations as are
4 necessary to carry out paragraph (1).

5 (d) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
6 PROVISION TO OR PURCHASE FROM PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
7 OF CHINA OF COVERED NATIONAL INTEREST TECH-
8 NOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY.—

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall, pursu-
10 ant to the International Emergency Economic Pow-
11 ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit
12 all transactions in all property and interests in prop-
13 erty of a person described in paragraph (2) if such
14 property and interests in property are in the United
15 States, come within the United States, or are or
16 come within the possession or control of a United
17 States person.

18 (2) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person described
19 in this paragraph is—

20 (A) a foreign person that, on or after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act, knowingly
22 sells or otherwise provides to, or knowingly pur-
23 chases from, the People’s Republic of China any
24 covered national interest technology or intellec-

1 tual property subject to the jurisdiction of the
2 United States; or

3 (B) a Chinese person that, on or after such
4 date of enactment, knowingly uses covered na-
5 tional interest technology or intellectual prop-
6 erty provided to the Chinese person in violation
7 of subsection (c) or any other export control law
8 of the United States.

9 (3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF
10 GOODS.—

11 (A) IN GENERAL.—The requirement to
12 block and prohibit all transactions in all prop-
13 erty and interests in property under paragraph
14 (1) shall not include the authority to impose
15 sanctions on the importation of goods.

16 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,
17 the term “good” means any article, natural or
18 man-made substance, material, supply or manu-
19 factured product, including inspection and test
20 equipment, and excluding technical data.

21 (4) WAIVER.—The President may waive the im-
22 position of sanctions under paragraph (1) with re-
23 spect to a person if the President determines and re-
24 ports to Congress that the waiver is in the national
25 security interests of the United States.

1 (5) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—

2 (A) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President
3 may exercise all authorities provided under sec-
4 tions 203 and 205 of the International Emer-
5 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702
6 and 1704) to carry out this subsection.

7 (B) PENALTIES.—A person that violates,
8 attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or
9 causes a violation of paragraph (1) or any regu-
10 lation, license, or order issued to carry out that
11 paragraph shall be subject to the penalties set
12 forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206
13 of the International Emergency Economic Pow-
14 ers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as
15 a person that commits an unlawful act de-
16 scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

17 (C) INAPPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL EMER-
18 GENCY REQUIREMENT.—The requirements of
19 section 202 of the International Emergency
20 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701) shall
21 not apply for purposes of this subsection.

22 (e) ESTABLISHMENT OF LIST OF CERTAIN PROD-
23 UCTS RECEIVING SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT OF PEO-
24 PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA OR USED BY THAT GOVERN-
25 MENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 8 of title I of the
2 Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2241 et seq.) is
3 amended by adding at the end the following:

4 **“SEC. 183. LIST OF CERTAIN PRODUCTS RECEIVING SUP-**
5 **PORT FROM GOVERNMENT OF PEOPLE’S RE-**
6 **PUBLIC OF CHINA OR USED BY THAT GOV-**
7 **ERNMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.**

8 “(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after
9 the date of the enactment of the America COMPETES
10 Act of 2022, and annually thereafter, the United States
11 Trade Representative shall set forth a list of products
12 manufactured or produced in, or exported from, the Peo-
13 ple’s Republic of China that are determined by—

14 “(1) the Trade Representative—

15 “(A) to receive support from the Govern-
16 ment of the People’s Republic of China pursu-
17 ant to the Made in China 2025 Industrial policy
18 of that Government; or

19 “(B) to otherwise receive support from
20 that Government and that have or will in the
21 future displace net exports of like products by
22 the United States; or

23 “(2) the Secretary of State to be used by the
24 Government of the People’s Republic of China to

1 carry out violations of human rights or religious lib-
2 erties.

3 “(b) IDENTIFICATION OF PRODUCTS RECEIVING
4 SUPPORT PURSUANT TO MADE IN CHINA 2025 POLICY.—

5 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Trade Representative
6 shall include in the list under subsection (a)(1)(A)
7 any product specified in the following documents set
8 forth by the Government of the People’s Republic of
9 China:

10 “(A) Notice on Issuing Made in China
11 2025.

12 “(B) China Manufacturing 2025.

13 “(C) Notice on Issuing the 13th Five-year
14 National Strategic Emerging Industries Devel-
15 opment Plan.

16 “(D) Guiding Opinion on Promoting Inter-
17 national Industrial Capacity and Equipment
18 Manufacturing Cooperation.

19 “(E) Any other document that expresses a
20 national strategy or stated goal in connection
21 with the Made in China 2025 industrial policy
22 set forth by the Government of the People’s Re-
23 public of China, the Communist Party of China,
24 or another entity or individual capable of im-

1 pacting the national strategy of the People's
2 Republic of China.

3 “(2) INCLUDED PRODUCTS.—In addition to
4 such products as the Trade Representative shall in-
5 clude pursuant to paragraph (1) in the list under
6 subsection (a)(1)(A), the Trade Representative shall
7 include products in the following industries:

8 “(A) Civil aircraft.

9 “(B) Turbine engines.

10 “(C) Motor car and vehicle.

11 “(D) Advanced medical equipment.

12 “(E) Advanced construction equipment.

13 “(F) Agricultural machinery.

14 “(G) Railway equipment.

15 “(H) Diesel locomotive.

16 “(I) Moving freight.

17 “(J) Semiconductor.

18 “(K) Lithium battery manufacturing.

19 “(L) Artificial intelligence.

20 “(M) High-capacity computing.

21 “(N) Quantum computing.

22 “(O) Robotics.

23 “(P) Biotechnology.”.

24 (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The table of con-
25 tents for the Trade Act of 1974 is amended by in-

1 serting after the item relating to section 182 the fol-
2 lowing:

“Sec. 183. List of certain products receiving support from Government of People’s Republic of China or used by that Government for human rights violations.”.

3 **SEC. 30634. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF TIKTOK ON**
4 **FEDERAL SYSTEMS.**

5 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

6 (1) the term “covered application” means the
7 social networking service TikTok or any successor
8 application or service developed or provided by
9 ByteDance Limited or an entity owned by
10 ByteDance Limited;

11 (2) the term “executive agency” has the mean-
12 ing given that term in section 133 of title 41, United
13 States Code; and

14 (3) the term “information technology” has the
15 meaning given that term in section 11101 of title
16 40, United States Code.

17 (b) PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF TIKTOK.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after
19 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director
20 of the Office of Management and Budget, in con-
21 sultation with the Administrator of General Services,
22 the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure
23 Security Agency, the Director of National Intel-
24 ligence, and the Secretary of Defense, and consistent

1 with the information security requirements under
2 subchapter II of chapter 35 of title 44, United
3 States Code, shall develop standards and guidelines
4 for executive agencies requiring the removal of any
5 covered application from information technology.

6 (2) NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESEARCH EX-
7 CEPTIONS.—The standards and guidelines developed
8 under paragraph (1) shall include—

9 (A) exceptions for law enforcement activi-
10 ties, national security interests and activities,
11 and security researchers; and

12 (B) for any authorized use of a covered ap-
13 plication under an exception, requirements for
14 agencies to develop and document risk mitiga-
15 tion actions for such use.

16 **SEC. 30635. PROHIBITION ON DISCLOSING GENETIC INFOR-**
17 **MATION TO CHINA.**

18 (a) PROHIBITION.—A commercial DNA testing serv-
19 ice may not disclose the genetic information of any indi-
20 vidual, or any aggregate of such information, to the Peo-
21 ple’s Republic of China, or to any entity under the influ-
22 ence, control, or ownership of the People’s Republic of
23 China.

24 (b) ENFORCEMENT BY FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
25 SION.—

1 (1) UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRAC-
2 TICES.—A violation of this section or a regulation
3 promulgated under this section shall be treated as a
4 violation of a regulation under section 18(a)(1)(B)
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.
6 57a(a)(1)(B)) regarding unfair or deceptive acts or
7 practices.

8 (2) POWERS OF COMMISSION.—The Federal
9 Trade Commission shall enforce this section and the
10 regulations promulgated under this section in the
11 same manner, by the same means, and with the
12 same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all
13 applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade
14 Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incor-
15 porated into and made part of this section. Any per-
16 son who violates this section or a regulation promul-
17 gated under this section shall be subject to the pen-
18 alties and entitled to the privileges and immunities
19 provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act.

20 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

21 (1) COMMERCIAL DNA TESTING SERVICE.—The
22 term “commercial DNA testing service” means any
23 person that provides genealogical or ancestry-related
24 information based on an individual’s DNA.

1 (2) GENETIC INFORMATION.—The term “ge-
2 netic information” means, with respect to any indi-
3 vidual, information about such individual’s genetic
4 tests.

5 (3) GENETIC TEST.—The term “genetic test”
6 has the meaning given such term by section 201 of
7 the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of
8 2008 (Public Law 110–233; 42 U.S.C. 2000ff).

9 **Subtitle E—Strengthening Our**
10 **Partnerships With Taiwan**

11 **PART 1—PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE**
12 **WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION**

13 **SEC. 30641. PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD**
14 **HEALTH ORGANIZATION.**

15 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
16 ings:

17 (1) The World Health Organization (WHO) is
18 a specialized agency of the United Nations, charged
19 with coordinating health efforts within the United
20 Nations system. The World Health Assembly
21 (WHA) is the decision-making body of the WHO,
22 which convenes annually in May to set the policies
23 and priorities of the organization. Statehood is not
24 a requirement for attendance at the WHA, and nu-
25 merous observers, including nonmembers and non-

1 governmental organizations, attended the most re-
2 cent virtual WHA in May 2020.

3 (2) Taiwan began seeking to participate in the
4 WHO as an observer in 1997. In 2009, with strong
5 support from successive United States Administra-
6 tions, Congress, and like-minded WHO Member
7 States, and during a period of improved Cross-Strait
8 relations, Taiwan received an invitation to attend
9 the WHA as an observer under the name “Chinese
10 Taipei”. Taiwan received the same invitation each
11 year until 2016, when following the election of Presi-
12 dent Tsai-Ing Wen of the Democratic Progressive
13 Party, Taiwan’s engagement in the international
14 community began facing increased resistance from
15 the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Taiwan’s in-
16 vitation to the 2016 WHA was received late and in-
17 cluded new language conditioning Taiwan’s partici-
18 pation on the PRC’s “one China principle”. The
19 WHO did not invite Taiwan to attend the WHA as
20 an observer in 2017, 2018, 2019, or 2020.

21 (3) Taiwan remains a model contributor to
22 world health, having provided financial and technical
23 assistance to respond to numerous global health
24 challenges. Taiwan has invested over \$6 billion in
25 international medical and humanitarian aid efforts

1 impacting over 80 countries since 1996. In 2014,
2 Taiwan responded to the Ebola crisis by donating \$1
3 million and providing 100,000 sets of personal pro-
4 tective equipment., Through the Global Cooperation
5 and Training Framework – which partners Taiwan
6 with the United States and Japan as a platform for
7 sharing Taiwan’s expertise in a variety of crucial
8 fields – the United States and Taiwan have jointly
9 conducted training programs for technical health ex-
10 perts to combat MERS, Dengue Fever, and Zika. In
11 2020, after successfully containing the spread of the
12 novel coronavirus within its borders while upholding
13 democratic principles, Taiwan generously donated
14 millions of pieces of personal protective equipment
15 and COVID-19 tests to countries in need. These dis-
16 eases know no borders, and Taiwan’s needless exclu-
17 sion from global health cooperation increases the
18 dangers presented by global pandemics.

19 (4) Taiwan’s international engagement has
20 faced increased resistance from the PRC. Taiwan
21 was not invited to the 2016 Assembly of the Inter-
22 national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), despite
23 participating as a guest at the organization’s prior
24 summit in 2013. Taiwan’s requests to participate in
25 the General Assembly of the International Criminal

1 Police Organization (INTERPOL) have also been
2 rejected. In May 2017, PRC delegates disrupted a
3 meeting of the Kimberley Process on conflict dia-
4 monds held in Perth, Australia, until delegates from
5 Taiwan were asked to leave. Since 2016, the Demo-
6 cratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, the Re-
7 public of Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina
8 Faso, the Republic of El Salvador, the Solomon Is-
9 lands, and the Republic of Kiribati have terminated
10 longstanding diplomatic relationships with Taiwan
11 and granted diplomatic recognition to the PRC.

12 (5) Congress has established a policy of support
13 for Taiwan's participation in international bodies
14 that address shared transnational challenges, par-
15 ticularly in the WHO. Congress has passed multiple
16 measures to direct the Secretary of State to estab-
17 lish a strategy for, and to report annually to Con-
18 gress on, efforts to obtain observer status for Tai-
19 wan at the WHA. Congress also passed legislation
20 directing the Secretary to report on a strategy to
21 gain observer status for Taiwan at the ICAO Assem-
22 bly, and to report on a strategy to gain observer sta-
23 tus for Taiwan at the INTERPOL Assembly. How-
24 ever, since 2016 Taiwan has not received an invita-
25 tion to attend any of these events as an observer.

1 (b) AUGMENTATION OF REPORT CONCERNING THE
2 PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN THE WORLD HEALTH OR-
3 GANIZATION.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (c) of section 1
5 of Public Law 108–235 (118 Stat. 656) is amended
6 by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

7 “(3) An account of the changes and improve-
8 ments the Secretary of State has made to the
9 United States plan to endorse and obtain observer
10 status for Taiwan at the World Health Assembly,
11 following any annual meetings of the World Health
12 Assembly at which Taiwan did not obtain observer
13 status.”.

14 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made
15 by paragraph (1) shall take effect and apply begin-
16 ning with the first report required under subsection
17 (c) of section 1 of Public Law 108–235 that is sub-
18 mitted after the date of the enactment of this Act.

19 **PART 2—TAIWAN RELATIONS MODERNIZATION**
20 **ACT**

21 **Subpart A—U.S.-Taiwan Relations**

22 **SEC. 30651. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENHANCING THE**
23 **UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PARTNERSHIP.**

24 It is the policy of the United States—

1 (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the
2 United States Indo-Pacific strategy;

3 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its
4 democracy as key elements for the continued peace
5 and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and
6 a vital national security interest of the United
7 States;

8 (3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan
9 under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8)
10 and the “Six Assurances”;

11 (4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its
12 asymmetric defense strategy;

13 (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense
14 spending in order to fully resource its defense strat-
15 egy;

16 (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-
17 cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-
18 fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop
19 and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including
20 anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense,
21 undersea warfare, advanced command, control, com-
22 munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,
23 and reconnaissance, and resilient command and con-
24 trol capabilities, into its military forces;

1 (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's
2 meaningful participation in the United Nations, the
3 World Health Assembly, the International Civil
4 Aviation Organization, the International Criminal
5 Police Organization, and other international bodies
6 as appropriate;

7 (8) to advocate for information sharing with
8 Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on
9 Cancer;

10 (9) to promote meaningful cooperation among
11 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded
12 partners;

13 (10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten-
14 tially through new agreements or resumption of
15 talks related to a possible Trade and Investment
16 Framework Agreement;

17 (11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu-
18 ance of a bilateral free trade agreement;

19 (12) to expand bilateral economic and techno-
20 logical cooperation, including improving supply chain
21 security;

22 (13) to support United States educational and
23 exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro-
24 moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his-
25 tory, and politics in Taiwan; and

1 (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be-
2 tween the United States and Taiwan.

3 **SEC. 30652. REAUTHORIZATION OF TAIWAN ASSURANCE**
4 **ACT.**

5 Section 315 of subtitle B of division FF of the Con-
6 solidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Public Law 116–260;
7 commonly referred to as the Taiwan Assurance Act) is
8 amended adding at the end the following:

9 “(d) Periodic Review – For as long as the guidance
10 described in subsection (a) remains in effect, the Secretary
11 shall conduct periodic reviews as described in subsection
12 (a) and submit updated reports as described in subsection
13 (c) not less frequently than every two years following the
14 submission of the initial report described in subsection
15 (c).”.

16 **SEC. 30653. TAIWAN SYMBOLS OF SOVEREIGNTY.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
18 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
19 shall rescind any contact guideline, internal restriction,
20 section of the Foreign Affairs Manual or Foreign Affairs
21 Handbook, related guidance, or related policies that, ex-
22 plicitly or implicitly, including through restrictions or limi-
23 tations on activities of United States personnel, limits the
24 ability of members of the armed forces of the Republic
25 of China (Taiwan) and government representatives from

1 the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office
2 (TECRO) to display for official purposes symbols of Re-
3 public of China sovereignty, including—

4 (1) the flag of the Republic of China (Taiwan);

5 and

6 (2) the corresponding emblems or insignia of
7 military units.

8 (b) OFFICIAL PURPOSES DEFINED.—In this section,
9 the term “official purposes” means—

10 (1) the wearing of official uniforms;

11 (2) conducting government-hosted ceremonies
12 or functions; and

13 (3) appearances on Department of State social
14 media accounts promoting engagements with Tai-
15 wan.

16 (c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
17 tion shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplo-
18 matic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or
19 altering the United States Government’s position on Tai-
20 wan’s international status.

21 **SEC. 30654. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this Act or any other
23 provision of law may be construed to require the United
24 States Government to refer to the democratically elected
25 government of Taiwan as the “Taiwan authorities,” or

1 preclude referring to the democratically elected govern-
2 ment of Taiwan as a “government.”

3 (b) ENGAGEMENT WITH TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.—
4 The Department of State and other United States Govern-
5 ment departments and agencies shall engage with the
6 democratically elected government of Taiwan as the legiti-
7 mate representative of the people of Taiwan and end the
8 outdated practice of referring to the Government of Tai-
9 wan as the “Taiwan authorities”. Notwithstanding the
10 continued supporting role of the American Institute in
11 Taiwan in carrying out United States foreign policy and
12 protecting United States interests in Taiwan, the United
13 States Government shall not place any restrictions on the
14 ability of officials of the Department of State and other
15 United States Government departments and agencies to
16 interact directly and routinely with counterparts in the
17 Taiwan government.

18 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this sec-
19 tion may be construed as entailing restoration of diplo-
20 matic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or
21 altering the United States Government’s position on Tai-
22 wan’s international status.

1 **SEC. 30655. REPRESENTATIVE TITLE FOR DIRECTOR OF**
2 **AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN'S TAIPEI**
3 **OFFICE.**

4 The position of Director of the American Institute in
5 Taiwan's Taipei office shall have the title of Representa-
6 tive.

7 **SEC. 30656. AUTHORIZATION OF GLOBAL COOPERATION**
8 **AND TRAINING FRAMEWORK.**

9 (a) GLOBAL COOPERATION AND TRAINING FRAME-
10 WORK.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is
12 authorized to conduct training programs, workshops,
13 and other activities with the government of Taiwan
14 pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding be-
15 tween the United States and Taiwan signed in 2015
16 on the Global Cooperation and Training Framework.

17 (2) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of
18 Congress that Global Cooperation and Training
19 Framework activities that promote ties between the
20 United States, Taiwan, and other democratic part-
21 ners, or that undergird Taiwan's diplomatic relation-
22 ships, or that counter malign authoritarian activi-
23 ties, are particularly beneficial to our shared inter-
24 ests, and that examples of such activities in 2019 in-
25 clude:

1 (A) the “Good Energy Governance in the
2 Indo-Pacific” workshop, co-hosted by Japan,
3 and Australia;

4 (B) the “International Austronesian Lan-
5 guages Revitalization Forum,” co-hosted with
6 Japan and held in Palau, a nation that main-
7 tains diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and

8 (C) the “Defending Democracy through
9 Media Literacy II” workshop, which focused on
10 addressing and countering disinformation in
11 democratic elections and was co-hosted by
12 Japan and Sweden.

13 (D) the “Anti-Corruption in the Public and
14 Private Sections” workshop, which focused on
15 promoting clean governance, preventing cor-
16 porate governance, and preserving competitive-
17 ness through trade secret protection, and co-
18 hosted by Japan.

19 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
20 are authorized to be appropriated \$3,000,000 for each of
21 the fiscal years 2026 through 2026 for the Global Co-
22 operation and Training Framework.

1 **Subpart B—U.S.-Taiwan Defense and Security**

2 **Cooperation**

3 **SEC. 30661. BOLSTERING THE UNITED STATES SECURITY**

4 **PARTNERSHIP WITH TAIWAN.**

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the Sense of Con-
6 gress that steps to bolster United States security partner-
7 ship in the Indo-Pacific must include encouraging and fa-
8 cilitating Taiwan’s accelerated acquisition of asymmetric
9 defense capabilities, which are crucial to defending the is-
10 lands of Taiwan from invasion, including long-range preci-
11 sion fires, munitions, anti-ship missiles, coastal defense,
12 anti-armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced com-
13 mand, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
14 surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and resilient
15 command and control capabilities, and increasing the con-
16 duct of relevant and practical training and exercises with
17 Taiwan’s defense forces;

18 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
19 of the United States—

20 (1) to strenuously oppose any action by the
21 People’s Republic of China to use force to change
22 the status quo on Taiwan; and

23 (2) that, in order to deter the use of force by
24 the People’s Republic of China to change the status
25 quo on Taiwan, the United States should coordinate
26 with allies and partners to identify and develop sig-

1 nificant economic, diplomatic, and other measures to
2 deter and impose costs on any such action by the
3 People's Republic of China, and to bolster deterrence
4 by articulating such policies publicly, as appropriate
5 and in alignment with United States interests.

6 SEC. 30662. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO SHARP POWER OP-
7 ERATIONS TARGETING TAIWAN.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and implement a strategy to respond to sharp power operations and the united front campaign supported by the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that are directed toward persons or entities in Taiwan.

15 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
16 section (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) Development of a response to PRC propaganda and disinformation campaigns and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, including—

(A) assistance in building the capacity of the Taiwan government and private-sector entities to document and expose propaganda and disinformation supported by the Government of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Communist Party, or affiliated entities;

1 (B) assistance to enhance the Taiwan gov-
2 ernment's ability to develop a whole-of-govern-
3 ment strategy to respond to sharp power oper-
4 ations, including election interference; and

5 (C) media training for Taiwan officials and
6 other Taiwan entities targeted by
7 disinformation campaigns.

8 (2) Development of a response to political influ-
9 ence operations that includes an assessment of the
10 extent of influence exerted by the Government of the
11 People's Republic of China and the Chinese Com-
12 munist Party in Taiwan on local political parties, fi-
13 nancial institutions, media organizations, and other
14 entities.

15 (3) Support for exchanges and other technical
16 assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system's
17 ability to respond to sharp power operations.

18 (4) Establishment of a coordinated partnership,
19 through the Global Cooperation and Training
20 Framework, with like-minded governments to share
21 data and best practices with the Government of Tai-
22 wan on ways to address sharp power operations sup-
23 ported by the Government of the People's Republic
24 of China and the Chinese Communist Party.

1 **SEC. 30663. REPORT.**

2 Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
3 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation
4 with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appro-
5 priate committees a report on the feasibility of enhancing
6 the self-defense capabilities of Taiwan through the For-
7 eign Military Financing program of the Department of
8 State.

9 **SEC. 30664. BRIEFING ON TAIWAN SECURITY COOPERA-**
10 **TION.**

11 Section 1260A of the National Defense Authorization
12 Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283) is amend-
13 ed—

14 (1) by striking the heading and inserting “**AN-**
15 **NUAL BRIEFING ON TAIWAN SECURITY CO-**
16 **OPERATION**”; and

17 (2) by adding at the appropriate place in sub-
18 section (b) the following new paragraph:

19 “(4) A description of United States efforts to
20 help Taiwan deter and defeat any military aggres-
21 sion, including bilateral and multilateral—

22 “(A) individual- and unit-level training;
23 and

24 “(B) operational exercise programs that
25 build combined readiness, interoperability,

1 lethality, survivability, joint planning capability,
2 and shared warfighting situational awareness.”.

3 **SEC. 30665. TAIWAN STATUS REGARDING EXCESS DEFENSE**
4 **ARTICLES.**

5 Taiwan shall receive the same benefits conferred for
6 the purposes of transfers pursuant to section 516(c)(2)
7 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
8 2321j(c)(2)).

9 **Subpart C—U.S.-Taiwan Technology & Economic**
10 **Cooperation and Harmonization Act**

11 **SEC. 30671. FINDINGS.**

12 Congress finds the following:

13 (1) Taiwan is the United States’ tenth largest
14 partner for bilateral trade in goods, with total trade
15 of \$86 billion, and the United States’ fifteenth larg-
16 est export market, a destination for \$31.8 billion in
17 U.S. exports in 2019.

18 (2) Bilateral trade data dramatically under-
19 states Taiwan’s importance to the United States’
20 economy. The trade data does not include the IP li-
21 censing and contracted manufacturing relationships
22 between the United States and Taiwan and does not
23 include the overseas production of Taiwan companies
24 for export to the United States. In 2018, Taiwan
25 firms received \$146 billion in U.S. export orders

1 compared with official U.S. data that showed \$46
2 billion in Taiwan merchandise exports to the United
3 States

4 (3) Advanced technology supply chains are of
5 particular importance to the U.S.-Taiwan relation-
6 ship, and companies from the United States and
7 Taiwan share mutually beneficial links that have al-
8 lowed them to collectively establish a dominant posi-
9 tion in the global manufacture of advanced micro-
10 electronics, a strategic industry of existential impor-
11 tance for the United States' national security and
12 economic prosperity. For example, 60% of Taiwan
13 Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation's revenue
14 derived from North American customers in 2019. In
15 2018, Taiwan was the third largest importer of
16 semiconductor manufacturing equipment produced
17 in the United States.

18 (4) U.S.-Taiwan advanced technology supply
19 chains, especially microelectronics supply chains,
20 face significant external threats from malign indus-
21 trial policies that pose both military and economic
22 risks.

1 **SEC. 30672. U.S.-TAIWAN TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC SE-**
2 **CURITY STRATEGY.**

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
4 enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for a period
5 of four years, the Secretary of State, following interagency
6 consultation as appropriate, shall submit to the appro-
7 priate Congressional Committees a strategy to deepen
8 U.S.-Taiwan economic relations and strengthen supply
9 chain security in critical technologies.

10 (b) SUBJECT MATTER.—The strategy specified in
11 subsection (a) shall include:

12 (1) a description of the full range of U.S. inter-
13 ests in U.S.-Taiwan economic relations;

14 (2) an identification of requests the government
15 of Taiwan has made to the United States relating to
16 our shared economic relations that remain out-
17 standing;

18 (3) an identification of requests the United
19 States has made to the government of Taiwan relat-
20 ing to our shared economic relations that remain
21 outstanding;

22 (4) a description of specific steps the adminis-
23 tration plans to take to address each such unre-
24 solved issue;

25 (5) an identification of critical technology sup-
26 ply chains of particular importance to the U.S.-Tai-

1 wan economic relationship, U.S.-Taiwan interactions
2 regarding such supply chains, and specific steps the
3 administration plans to take to enhance the security
4 and harmonize the regulation of such supply chains;
5 and

(6) a description of government-to-government interactions between the United States and Taiwan that have or will be conducted to address the matters described in paragraphs (1) through (5).

(c) FORM.—The report specified in subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

13 SEC. 30673. U.S.-TAIWAN ECONOMIC PROSPERITY PARTNER-
14 SHIP DIALOGUE.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, or their designee at no lower than the rank of Undersecretary, with interagency consultation and participation as appropriate, shall convene an Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue with the government of Taiwan.

(b) FREQUENCY AND LOCATION.—The Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue shall be convened annually and shall be held in an alternating basis in Washington, D.C., and Taipei.

24 (c) SUBJECT MATTER OF DIALOGUE.—The subject
25 matter of the dialogue shall include:

1 (1) The matters included in the U.S. Taiwan
2 Technology and Economic Security Strategy.

3 (2) Efforts to align and harmonize export con-
4 trols rules and licensing policies, the definition of
5 critical technologies, and the administration and en-
6 forcement of export controls for critical technologies,
7 including deemed exports.

8 (3) The advancement of mutual economic secu-
9 rity priorities of the United States and Taiwan, such
10 as joint efforts to secure technology supply chains,
11 invest in secure production, and reduce dependencies
12 on adversarial countries for a significant source of
13 revenues.

14 (4) Cooperation to respond to shared threats to
15 economic security and technology supply chains,
16 such as malign industrial policies that seek to ex-
17 tract technological talent, know-how, and expertise
18 from such supply chains in Taiwan and the United
19 States, specifically including human capital.

20 (5) U.S.-Taiwan research collaboration, edu-
21 cational exchange, and strategic investment and
22 R&D for critical technologies.

23 (d) WORKING LEVEL ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary
24 shall conduct continuing engagements and consultations
25 with the Government of Taiwan at the working level as

1 necessary to advance the U.S.-Taiwan Technology and
2 Economic Security Strategy.

3 (e) CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION.—The Sec-
4 retary or their designee shall consult with the appropriate
5 Congressional Committees prior to and after convening
6 each U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dia-
7 logue.

8 **SEC. 30674. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES**
9 **DEFINED.**

10 In this title, the term “appropriate Congressional
11 Committees” means the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
12 the House of Representatives and the Committee on For-
13 eign Relations of the Senate.

